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ABSTRAK 
Banyak penelitian akuntansi yang melibatkan pemisahan sampel menjadi 
beberapa grup atas dasar metoda akuntansi. Kemudian peneliti membandingkan 
karakteristik antargrup dan menguji perbedaannya secara statistis dan regresional. 
Dalam memecah sampel menjadi beberapa grup, pada umumnya diasumsi bahwa dua 
sampel atau lebih diambil dari populasi yang homogenus dan penempatan observasi ke 
dalam grup dianngap terjadi secara random. Dengan asumsi tersebut bias seleksi 
(selection bias) diabaikan sehingga dapat mengakibatkan estimasi lebih 
(overestimation) koefisien regresi pada salah satu grup sehingga simpulan dapat salah. 
Makalah ini menginvestigasi eksistensi dan relevansi bias seleksi dalam penelitian 
yang membandingkan dua grup atas dasar metoda akuntansi untuk kasus industri 
minyak dan gas bumi. Regresi berganti dua-tahap (two-stage switching regression) 
digunakan untuk menunjukkan adanya bias seleksi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan 
bahwa terdapat bias seleksi dalam penggunaan regresi untuk mengukur pengaruh 
faktor-faktor ekonomik terhadap pengeluaran untuk eksplorasi. Pendekatan ordinary 
least square (OLS) secara konsistem mengestimasi lebih (overestimate) koefisien-
koefisien regressi untuk kedua grup terutama perusahaan yang menggunakan metoda 
kos penuh (full cost).  
Kata kunci: pilihan metode akuntansi,kuadrat terkecil ordiner, regresi berganti dua-
langkah, kos penuh, usaha berhasil, minyak dan gas bumi. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses the issue of selection 
bias in the analyses of economic consequences 
of mandatory accounting changes. The self-
selection bias analyses are based on the idea 
that individuals choose one of two accounting 
methods on the basis of expected benefits from 
adopting one method over the other. Therefore, 
an analysis of economic consequences of 
mandatory accounting changes that ignore firm 
characteristics influencing the choice of 
accounting method may result in biased 
estimates of parameters under the study. 
Shehata (1991) uses the case of SFAS No. 
2 to illustrate the effects of selection bias on 
parameters of economic consequences analysis 
model. In order to apply the procedure, 
accounting choice decision and research and 
development (R&D) investment decision 
models are developed with their explanatory 
variables. R&D investment decision model is 
used to represent economic consequence 
analysis (structural change in the spending 
behavior of switching firms). Using the 
unbiased (corrected) estimates of the research 
and development (R&D) behavior model, 
Shehata then examines structural changes in 
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the R&D model after the implementation of 
SFAS No. 2 and measured the sensitivity of 
the results to self-selection bias. The method 
used to correct for self-selectivity is a two-
stage switching regression procedure devel-
oped by Heckman (1976, 1979) and Lee (1976, 
1978). This structural change analysis may 
result in unwarranted conclusions if latent 
variables (firms characteristics) that affect the 
selection of method by sample firms are not 
taken into account in the analysis. Accounting 
choice decision model is developed to 
represent potential latent variables and to 
measure their joint impact on the behavioral 
relationship so that the resulting bias in the 
sample firm can be accounted for in the 
structural analysis. The study indicates that 
selection bias exists in both the capitalizing 
and expensing groups as shown by systematic 
differences between the results of OLS and 
switching regression estimates. After con-
trolling the effects of macroeconomic factors, 
the structural analysis indicates that there is a 
different effect of SFAS No. 2 on the R&D 
spending behavior of previous capitalizers. 
Maddala (1991) points out that empirical 
examples on self-selection bias so far do not 
show any strong evidence of selection bias. 
Self-selection is assumed to exist because 
firms select one method over the other on the 
basis of perceived benefits. In other words, 
firms choose between accounting methods on 
the basis of their own characteristics and the 
relative advantages of each method. With 
regard to Shehata's study, Maddala argues that 
R&D expenditures do not have the inter-
pretation of benefit and cannot be the criterion 
on the basis of which firms select a particular 
method. Maddala emphasizes that the esti-
mates from OLS with and without the 
selectivity term included are basically the 
same. Furthermore, an examination of the 
estimated coefficient after correction for bias 
indicates that differences in the behavior 
persist even after the firms in one group are 
placed in another group. Therefore, the results 
suggest that there is no strong evidence for 
selection bias, thus an important assumption of 
the selection model is perhaps not valid and 
may need further investigation.  
This paper will applies Shehata's model and 
procedures to the case of SFAS No.19. The 
objective of this paper to examine the rele-
vance of selection bias and to corroborate the 
validity of Shehata's research findings. The 
discussion in this paper will be limited to the 
issue of existence of selection bias in typical 
accounting choice related studies. This paper 
will not further examine and test the impact of 
the bias on the parameters of structural 
changes model for the firms switching from 
full-cost to successful effort method mandated 
by SFAS No. 19. 
SELECTION BIAS AND ITS IMPACT ON 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
Studies on economic consequences of 
mandatory changes in accounting method 
usually require grouping of samples into two 
groups by the methods under the study and 
examining the behavior changes of the firms 
before and after switching to a mandatory 
method. The problem of selection bias arises 
whenever there is a non-random sampling in 
the grouping of sample firms. Selection bias 
refers to the bias in the estimates obtained by 
the usual procedures of estimation that ignore 
the non-randomness of the samples (Maddala 
1991). Even though there is no difference in 
the impact on estimation methods, Maddala 
distinguishes self-selection bias from sample-
selection bias. Self-selection bias occurs in the 
case where the non-randomness arises from 
researcher's choices whereas sample-selection 
bias occurs whenever the investigator designs 
the sample or imposes some restriction on the 
sample.  
Shehata (1991) describes four sources of 
sample selection-bias and their effects on 
parameter estimates: self-selection, truncation, 
latent-variables and imposition of selection 
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criteria. Economic consequences researches 
often suffer from self-selection bias because 
managers must choose one among alternative 
accounting methods and the choice of method 
is conditional upon the firm-specific charac-
teristics. Truncation problem may arise as 
firms' characteristics change over time that 
managers voluntarily switch from one method 
to the other. Joint effect of latent variables on 
accounting method decision and economic 
consequence decision may result in violation 
of independence and zero expectation of error 
terms in the estimation model. Specifying 
certain criteria for selecting sample obser-
vations may result in selection bias because the 
selected sample is no longer random. Whatever 
the sources of the nonrandomness, using non-
random data to estimate economic conesquen-
ce model may compound the parameters of 
interest with parameters of accounting 
selection model. 
Several studies in economics and 
accounting were devoted to the issues of 
selection biases and remedial methods to 
overcome them. For example, Gronau (1974) 
examines the issue of selection bias in the 
study of wage rates. When comparison 
analysis of wages of different population 
groups (among other, male-female and white-
nonwhite differential rates) is attempted, one 
should take into account the workers' different 
job strategy (by developing selection criteria 
function), otherwise a selection bias will result. 
Traditional empirical studies concerning labor-
force participation, wages and earnings are 
based on the observed distribution while some 
part is not observed because some wage-offers 
are rejected by job-seekers as unacceptable. 
Therefore, the data do not represent the total 
population and selectivity bias will arise. 
Using search model as a criterion function to 
correct the bias, the study indicates that 
traditional measures underestimate the rate of 
return to human capital and its rate of 
depreciation when applied to married women. 
The measures also tend to overestimate the 
white-nonwhite wage differential, but tend to 
underestimate the differentials between males 
and females and between woman with and 
without young children. Indeed, this is the case 
of selection bias caused by truncation effect of 
data.  
Similar study to overcome the effects of 
truncation of data was done by Lee (1978) who 
examined the differential wage rates between 
union and non-union workers. Different from 
traditional model, he employed selection bias 
model to take into consideration the factors 
that effect the choice of labor union (i.e., union 
initiation fees, tastes and other membership 
requirements). He found that unionism does 
have a significant effect in raising wage rates. 
However, the results of comparison between 
the traditional and adjusted method indicate 
that unadjusted method overestimate the wage 
differentials for female and young workers but 
underestimate wage rates of most experienced 
male workers. Furthermore, estimates of tradi-
tional method underestimate the effect of 
unionism in the highest union coverage 
category and overestimate the effect in the 
lowest union coverage category. 
In the auditing area, Abdel-khalik (1990a) 
applied self-selection bias parameters esti-
mated from switching regressions to evaluate 
directly the costs (benefits) of knowledge 
spillovers arising from purchasing mana-
gement advisors services (MAS) from 
incumbent auditor. The study investigates the 
jointness (or synergy in a form of knowledge 
spillovers) of audit fee and demand for MAS 
to determine whether purchasing MAS from 
the incumbent auditor has a bearing on audit 
fees. The study is motivated by the idea that 
the presence of knowledge spillovers should at 
least prevent audit fees from being high 
because of resultant cost saving of providing 
joint products. Client should not pay higher 
cost for acquiring two products from one firm 
instead of two firms. Econometric analysis of 
the client's cost of selecting audit firm to 
provide MAS is used to evaluate the 
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probability that a client will self-select into one 
of two choices: buying the services from the 
incumbent auditor or from other firms. For the 
client, the costs of buying the services are 
influenced by the client's own internal 
organizational structure and view of the 
external environment in which audit services 
are acquired. However, prior empirical 
evidence indicates that audit fees tend to be 
higher for clients buying two product from the 
same firm. This suggests the absence of 
economic synergy between MAS and audit 
services. Heckman-Lee method is applied to 
the analysis to detect and correct self-selection 
bias. The resulting evidence of the study fails 
to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
impact of MAS characteristics on audit costs 
because the coefficients of self-selectivity 
variables (Mill's ratios) are not statistically 
significant. The result is consistent with prior 
evidence. 
In another study examining three possible 
specification problems with the research on 
information content of earnings disclosure, 
Abdel Khalik (1990b) includes the significance 
of the self-selection bias resulting from 
endogenous partitioning of sample information 
into good and bad news. He believes that in 
most earnings studies, partitioning the sample 
into good and bad news portfolios brings about 
a self-selection bias because such partitioning 
is based on characteristics and attributes of the 
firm that should not be ignored in the analysis. 
In particular, the good/bad news classification 
is not independent of changes in expectations 
about production, financing and investment 
decisions of the firm so that special estimation 
techniques is required to take an account of the 
variables. Two-stage switching regression is 
applied to evaluate self-selection bias using a 
total of 763 announcements data (391 first-
quarter and 372 second-quarter) of 98 sample 
firms taken from hard copies of Value Line 
from 1974 through 1978. The results of the 
study indicate that self-selection bias is 
statistically significant with the expected sign 
at p < 0.10 for the first quarter and at p < 0.05 
for the second quarter. 
Switching Regression Model 
Whenever sample separation is involved in 
a study that requires estimation of behavioral 
relationships using a portion of data, ordinary 
least square (OLS) method usually is not 
appropriate because consistency property of 
the OLS is violated. This violation will result 
in biased estimates of parameter. Several 
methods are proposed to overcome the 
selection bias (see for example, Lee, Maddala, 
and Trost 1980, Lee 1983, Maddala 1991). 
Two stage switching regression model using 
probit analysis exemplified by Heckman 
(1979) is one of the popular models. 
The general switching regression model 
contains two regimes described by a set of 
simultaneous equations as follows (Lee, 
Maddala, and Trost 1980):  
Ii = Zi - i (1) 
C1Y1i + 1X1i = 1i iff Ii > 0     (2) 
C2Y2i + 2X1i = 2i iff Ii   0      (3) 
In the equations, Ii is a vector of indicator 
variables. Y1i and Y2i are vectors of endo-
genous variables, Zi is a vector of exogenous 
variables, C1 and C2 are constant (normally 1). 
1i , 2i, and i are residual terms. , 1 , and 
2 are parameters. For a particular application, 
as will be in this paper, it is assumed that the 
residual 1, 2 , and  have a multivariate 
normal distribution with mean vector zero and 
covariance matrix: 
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Equation (1) represents the selection 
criterion function. The values of Ii are usually 
not observable in the data set but what is 
known is whether Ii > 0 or Ii  0. In economic 
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consequence analysis, Ii is normalized into a 
two-element vector representing dummy 
variable, i.e, Ii = 1 if Ii > 0 and Ii = 0 otherwise. 
Forcing Ii = 1 is the same thing as assuming 
that the variance of  to be 1. The model than 
becomes a simultaneous equations model with 
the selectivity criterion of the probit type and 
can be expressed in regression format as 
follows: 
Ii = Zi - i (4) 
Y1i = 1X1i + 1i iff Ii > 0      (5) 
Y2i = 2X2i + 2i iff Ii  0      (6) 
The OLS cannot be used to estimate 
equation (5) because E(1i) 0 due to the use 
of only a subset of data that meet the selection 
rule embodied in equation (4). The regression 
function for the subsample of equation (5) data 
can then be expressed as: 
E(Y1i  X1i , selection rule) = 1X1i +  
E(1i  selection rule) 
Similarly, regression function for the 
subsample of equation (6) data can be 
expressed as:  
E(Y2i  X2i , selection rule) = 2X2i +  
E(2i  selection rule) 
Incorporating the criterion function into the 
two regressions, the expected error terms can 
be stated as (Maddala 1991, Shehata 1991): 
E(1i  Y1i , selection rule) =  
    1 [(Zi)]/[(Zi)] 
                 =  1 W1i  
E(2i  Y2i , selection rule) =  
                    2 [(Zi)]/[1  (Zi)] 
                 = 2 W2i 
W1i and W2i are variables known as Mills 
ratios or selectivity variables. Incorporating 
these variables into the regression equations to 
correct biases, the regression functions (5) and 
(6) can be rewritten as:  
Y1i = 1X1i - 1W1i + 1i     (7) 
Y2i = X1i + 2W2i + 2i      (8) 
In the above equations, 1i and 2i are now 
error terms with zero expectation. The 
procedure to estimate the parameters is 
described in Heckman (1979) and Maddala 
(1983). After the two behavior relations have 
been correctly estimated, test of bias can be 
done by calculating the difference between 
what the behavior of each firm would have 
been had it belonged to the other group and the 
behavior under the current group. 
If the conditional expectation of each error 
term (1i and 2i) is zero, the regression 
function for each selected subsample is the 
same as the population regression function. In 
this case, OLS estimator may be used to 
estimate  on each selected subsample 
although the estimator may not be efficient.  
For economic consequence analysis, 
Shehata points out that the two-stage 
regression methodology has several advantages 
compared with ordinary OLS method. First, it 
provides a means for consistently and 
efficiently estimating coefficients of models in 
the presence of selection bias. Second, it 
allows researchers to explicitly model and 
examine the relationship between the 
accounting choice decision and the related 
production-investment decision. Finally, it 
provides expectations of the likely economic 
consequences of proposed accounting changes 
prior to their adoption, which might provide 
useful input into the rule-making process. 
However, there are some cautions in applying 
this method (Maddala 1991). First, the error 
terms in final equation are heteroscedastic so 
that the estimator may not be efficient. Second, 
Mills ratios are generated regressors so that 
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their standard errors are influenced by the 
method of estimation. Finally, multivariate 
normal distribution of error terms should be 
assumed.     
APPLICATION OF SWITCHING 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS TO SFAS NO. 
19 
A financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) Exposure Draft released on July 18, 
1977 proposed to eliminate the "full cost" 
accounting method used by many oil and gas 
producing companies to account for explo-
ration costs and recommended that all such 
companies be required to follow the 
"successful efforts" method. By the time the 
FASB Exposure Draft was released, full cost 
(FC) and successful efforts (SE) were the two 
basic methods used to account for oil and gas 
exploration costs. Companies had an option to 
select whatever method was appropriate for 
them. Under the full cost method, all 
exploratory costs are capitalized and these 
costs are amortized over the discovered 
reserves on a pro rata basis. On the other hand, 
under the successful efforts method only 
prediscovery costs that can be related directly 
to revenue producing wells are capitalized and 
the rest are expensed. On December 5, 1977, 
the FASB issued its statement No. 19 
affirming the proposal announced in the 
Exposure Draft. In August 1978, the SEC 
decided that neither full costing nor successful 
efforts could be supported and ruled that a new 
method of accounting must be developed for 
the industry based on recognition of the value 
of discovered reserves.
1
  
In fact, there had been a debate about the 
merits and consequences of the mandatory 
                                                     
1  SEC overruled this standard after hearings testimony 
from certain full cost adopters which felt that they would 
be disadvantaged by the mandatory method. This 
overruling does not affect the relevance of this paper 
since this paper will not examine the structural changes 
of exploration spending after involuntary switch if the 
standard were made effective. 
change in the accounting for exploration costs. 
The main argument of FC users was that a 
switch to the SE method would (a) substan-
tially depress reported earnings and equity 
figures and (b) increase significantly the 
volatility of earnings over time (as compared 
with the smoother earnings series resulting 
from the FC capitalization process). On the 
other hand, the FASB and its supporters 
defended the proposed accounting changes by 
arguing that (a) the SE method is conceptually 
more adequate than the FC method; (b) 
uniformity of accounting for oil and gas 
explorations will eliminate the burden of 
inconsistency, noncomparability, and mis-
understanding in the capital markets, and, thus, 
foster competition in capital allocation; and (c) 
many small independent producers have been 
using the SE method for a long time without 
apparent adverse effects on their ability to raise 
capital and to compete with the large producers 
(Lev 1979). 
The full cost and successful efforts 
methods usually produce markedly different 
results. Full cost always yields higher book 
asset values than successful efforts. Net 
income is higher under full cost when drilling 
and exploration costs are sufficiently large 
relative to production, and is lower when this 
is not the case. Furthermore, the issue of which 
method produces higher variability of reported 
result depends upon certain firm characteristics 
(Malmquist 1990). In the case of SFAS No. 2, 
Shehata (1991) mentions the argument that the 
elimination of the deferral option might induce 
managers to alter their R&D investment 
decisions, thus producing undesirable eco-
nomic consequences. The elimination of full 
cost as an acceptable method of accounting 
also brings about some undesirable economic 
consequences. For example, the ability of 
small producers to raise capital in the stock and 
money markets would be seriously inhibited, 
resulting in a cutback of new explorations and 
in a deterioration of the competitive position of 
independent oil and gas producers. Several 
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other issues related to the mandated change are 
the conceptual adequacy of the FC and SE 
methods, its impact on managerial behavior 
(e.g., is it a disincentive to risk-taking in 
exploration?), the effect on competition in the 
oil and gas industry, the ability of FC firms to 
raise money in capital markets after the switch, 
and its impact on capital markets (Lev 1979). 
To address these issues, several studies 
have been conducted. Lev (1979) examine 
whether the accounting change would 
adversely affect the equilibrium values of 
firms' equity security. The results of his study 
indicate that the release of the FASB Exposure 
Draft was associated with a downward revision 
of stock prices of oil and gas producers, 
particularly those using the FC method. Collins 
and Dent (1979) also find that the shares of oil 
and gas producing firms using the FC method 
suffered significant negative abnormal market 
return subsequent to the release of SFAS No. 
19 Exposure Draft. Using the same data from 
Collins and Dent study, Collins, Rozeff and 
Dhaliwal (1981) examine the economic 
determinants of the market reaction to the 
mandatory change and find that the FASB's 
proposal had a measurable negative effect on 
the equity values of affected firms. Lilien and 
Pastena (1982) examine the determinants of 
intramethod choice. They show that economic 
incentives influence the choice of FC and SE 
methods. DeAngelo (1982) provides evidence 
that oil and gas companies whose financial 
statements were adversely affected by SFAS 
No. 19 increased the rate at which they 
changed auditors during the FC/SE contro-
versy. Using the same data as used by 
Dyckman and Smith (1979) and Lev (1979), 
Lys investigates whether debt covenants are 
related to changes in firm value occurring with 
mandated accounting changes in the case of oil 
and gas accounting.  
All the above studies involve sample data 
that consist of two groups (i.e., firms adopting 
FC method and firms adopting SE method). 
These studies implicitly assume that sample 
firms are drawn from a homogeneous popu-
lation and are randomly assigned to the two 
groups and none of these studies applies the 
self-selection model. It can be argued that the 
sample firms in those studies self-select the 
method so that the observations are not 
randomly classified into two regimes. Shehata 
(1991) argues that if firms are not randomly 
assigned to the two samples, a potential self-
selection bias may lead to unwarranted 
conclusion about the economic impact of that 
accounting change. This paper will examine if 
selection bias is present in the sample data 
underlying those mandated change studies.  
Formulation of the Switching Regression 
Model 
Because of similarity in the issue between 
mandatory change in SFAS No. 2 and SFAS 
No. 19, the same model can be developed for 
the case of mandatory accounting change in 
the oil and gas companies. For the SFAS No. 
19 case, instead of R&D investment decision, 
exploration investment decision will be used to 
construct the behavioral model. The changes in 
the structure of exploration model after the 
mandated change measure the economic 
consequences of the implementation of SFAS 
No. 19.
2
 Therefore, the switching regression 
model for the case of SFAS No. 19 can be 
developed as follows: 
Let Z be a vector of exogenous variables 
representing firm characteristics that influence 
the choice between full-cost and successful 
efforts methods and let X be a vector of 
exogenous variables determining the explo-
ration investment decision.
3
 The equations that 
represent switching regression model may be 
expressed as follows: 
                                                     
2
 Again, because the standard never became effective, the 
structural test is not performed in this paper.  The focus 
of this paper is the detection of selection bias. 
3  The variables used in this paper and the underlying 
theories are discussed in the next section along with the 
construction of criterion and behavioral functions. 
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Accounting-choice decision model: 
ACi = Zi - i (9) 
where ACi is a latent variable representing the 
firm's preference to use either full-cost method 
(AC=1) or successful efforts method (AC=0) 
to account for exploration cost. 
Exploration investment decision models:  
EPLFi = F XFi + F Fi
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The statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients of selectivity correction terms (F 
and S) provides useful information about the 
extent to which the two decisions are 
interrelated. If accounting choice and explo-
ration investment decisions are independent, 
then it is expected that mandatory change to 
successful efforts method should not induce 
managers of previous full-costers to alter their 
exploration spending behavior. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis of no association can then be 
expressed in terms of zero coefficient of 
selectivity variables (Mills ratios). To test the 
hypothesis, two-stage estimation procedure is 
performed as follows: (1) Equation 9 is 
estimated for the total sample using the probit 
analysis. The estimated value of (Zi ) is then 
used to generate the Mills ratio for each sample 
observation, and (2) The selectivity correction 
terms are incorporated to the equation 10 and 
11 and then both are estimated by OLS.
4
 
                                                     
4 For more detailed procedure, see Heckman 1979 and 
Maddala 1983, 1991. 
FIRM-CHARACTERISTICS AND 
EXPLORATION DECISION MODELS 
AND DATA 
The fact that two accounting methods 
prevailed at the time the SFAS No. 19 
Exposure Draft was released indicated that 
there were in fact differences in the character-
istics and environments between firms 
adopting full cost and firms adopting 
successful efforts methods. Full cost adopters 
were the group that were greatly affected by 
the standard and hence they were in opposition 
to SFAS No. 19. Therefore, the fact that 
significant differences between companies 
using each accounting method was one of the 
primary arguments advanced by these 
companies to justify continued use of both 
methods. Four factors were considered to be 
the dimensions for the differentiation between 
nonmajor full cost and non major successful 
efforts companies are: (1) aggressiveness in 
exploration (2) the need for external capital, 
(3) size and (4) age. Deakin (1974) examined 
these four dimension by identifying seven 
discriminating variables to determine if the two 
groups of companies were in fact different. 
Those variables are: (1) average debt of 
explanatory wells, (2) number of exploration 
per revenues, (3) development wells/total 
wells, (4) debt/revenue, (5)capital expenditure/ 
revenue, (6) revenue and age of company in 
years. It is hypothesized that full cost and 
successful efforts companies can be 
distinguished on the basis of aggressiveness in 
exploration, perceived need for access to 
public markets, size and age of company, and 
relative extent of developing drilling. The 
hypotheses were tested by constructing 
multiple discriminant analysis (MDA). The 
analyses indicated that full cost companies are 
more aggressive in exploration, smaller, newer, 
more highly leveraged and spend more on 
capital expenditure per revenue dollar than do 
those in the successful efforts group. However, 
the test results indicated that only the 
differences in age, leverage and ratio of capital 
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expenditures to revenues are statistically signi-
ficant. 
Malmquist (1990) studied the relationships 
between observable firm characteristics and 
the likelihood choice of selecting full cost or 
successful efforts method. The relationships 
were discussed under the economic theory of 
security underwriting, debt covenant moni-
toring, managerial compensation scheme and 
political costs. He believed that the manner in 
which these factors influence the choice of 
method has a bearing on the economic 
characteristics of firms. Five characteristics are 
examined to determine their significant impact 
on the choice of method: debt equity ratio, 
source of financing, firm size, proportion of 
resources devoted to drilling and exploration 
and proportion of resources devoted to 
producing. Empirical tests were performed for 
three cases of samples: (1) all firms, (2) all 
firms except pipelines and public utilities, and 
(3) all firms except pipeline, public utilities, 
and major oil and gas companies using 1985 
end-year-date. Using logit model to test the 
hypothesized relationships he found that for 
each case sales, exploration cost, production 
volume and debt-equity ratio are significant 
variables and they have the predicted signs. 
Lilien and Pastena (1982) examine the 
determinants of intramethod choice in the oil 
and gas industry (full cost versus successful 
efforts). Their analysis is based on the idea that 
the choice of method is guided by economic 
motivation of managers to optimize income 
under certain environmental factor, i.e., poli-
tical pressure, contract compliance and 
uncertainty of exploration results. Different 
from other studies in this area, they consider 
jointly intramethod and intermethod in 
defining the maximization and minimization 
income. Firms are classified as either dual 
choice maximizers which were most motivated 
to maximize income or dual choice minimizer 
income, an economic model is constructed 
where choice is dependent variable and is 
defined in the context of intermethod choice, 
intramethod choice and the joint or dual choice 
of intermethod and intramethod policies. The 
model is then tested using probit, multiple 
discriminant and regression analyses. Expla-
natory variables are managerial motivation 
variables which consist of revenue as a 
political variable, age as a consistency 
variable, dry wells/total wells as a proxy for 
risk, and debt/shareholders' equity as a proxy 
for leverage. The test results indicate that 
revenue and age are positively associated with 
the choice of SE and policies which minimize 
cumulative income while leverage and risk 
variable (aggressiveness) are positively asso-
ciated with the choice of FC policies which 
maximize income. 
Construction of Criteria Function 
(Accounting Choice Model) 
Based on the above discussion on the 
determinants of accounting choice and in line 
with the model developed by Shehata (1991) 
for the case of SFAS No.2, three variables are 
selected as explanatory variables for the 
criterion model in this paper. The significance 
of the variables as shown by the empirical 
work and the availability of data are reasons 
for the selection. Then variables and their 
hypothesized relationships with the dependent 
variable are described as follows: 
1. Firm size: The political cost literature 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1978, Lilien & 
Pastena 1982, and Malmquist 1990) suggests 
that firms will tend to reduce their political 
cost by selecting policies that have an income-
decreasing effect. Therefore, it is hypothesized 
that the larger the firm, the lesser the 
likelihood it will choose full cost. 
2. Leverage: Contract-monitoring under 
the agency framework suggests that the higher 
the risk of breaking the debt covenants the 
more restrictive are the covenants. Income is a 
major element of accounting related-covenants 
that require higher figure for risky business. 
The higher the leverage, the higher the 
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tendency of managers to increase income 
though the choice of income increasing 
method. The more a firm is highly leveraged, 
the greater the likelihood that the firm will 
select full cost (Malmquist 1990, Deakin 
1979). 
3. Aggressiveness: In the testimony before 
SEC, many of full cost adopters argued that 
they were more aggressive in exploration than 
their successful efforts counterparts. This 
suggest that they need relatively greater fund 
either from debt or equity market. They argued 
that smooth earnings and greater assets and 
equity values were necessary to obtain new 
capital (Deakin 1979). The aggressiveness 
suggest that full cost companies commit a 
greater proportion of their resources to 
exploration. This is consistent with the 
market/engineering risk argument proposed by 
Malmquist (1990). It is hypothesized then that 
the greater the proportion of a firm's resources 
devoted to exploration, the greater the 
likelihood the firm will choose full cost. On 
the other hand, the greater the proportion of a 
firm's resources devoted to producing the 
lesser the likelihood the firm will choose full 
cost. The production resources variable will be 
used in this criterion function because explora-
tion resoures variable will be used as a 
dependent variable in the behavioral function. 
Table 1 describes the notation, expected sign 
and measurement of these variables. 
 
Table 1. Operational Definition of Variables Included in the Model 
Variables Predicted Sign Definition 
Dependent: 
  AC (accounting choice) 
  
The accounting method selected to account for 
exploration costs. AC=1 if the firm uses full 
cost and AC=0 if the firm uses successful 
effort method. Classification is based on 
Malmquist's data (1990). 
Explanatory: 
   SZ (firm size) 
 
 
   LV (leverage) 
 
 
 
   AG (aggressiveness) 
 
 
- 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
- 
 
Net sales as reported on the COMPUSTAT 
tapes. 
 
The ratio of long-term debt to market value of 
equity (outstanding shares X closing price) as 
reported on the COMPUSTAT tapes. 
 
Oil and gas produced in millions BTU 
equivalents. The values of this variable were 
derived from the data as reported on 
Malmquist (1990). 
 
Exploration Model 
Because of the similarity in the nature of 
decision concerning the R&D and Exploration, 
some explanatory variables used by Shehata 
will be selected for the same reasons described 
by Shehata. These variables are: 
1. Firm size: In general, larger firms are 
financially stronger than the smaller firms to 
undertake exploration project. It is expected 
that the larger the firm, the larger the explo-
ration expenditures. 
2. Cash flows: Riskiness of exploration 
activities can limit the possibility of external 
financing so that firms should rely on internal 
financing to support exploration projects. 
Therefore, the higher the cash flows generated 
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by a firm, the greater the firm's commitment to 
risky explorations projects (Shehata 1991). 
3. Capital expenditures: Companies nor-
mally make expenditures in both exploration 
and capital investment. Both type of expen-
ditures may be competing or complementary 
depending on the type of a firm. This paper 
will examine if firm-characteristics make a 
difference in this spending behavior. In the 
case of R&D, Shehata assumes that R&D 
activities are alternative for the capital com-
mitments made by the firm. Table 2 presents 
the definition (notation), expected sign and 
measurement of these variables.  
 
Table 2. Operational Definition of Variables Included in the Model 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Definition 
Dependent: 
   EX (exploration) 
 
 
Explanatory: 
   AT (firm size) 
 
 
   CF (cash flows) 
 
 
 
 
   CE (capital 
expenditures) 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
Total exploration cost for the year 1985. The values of 
this variable are derived from the data used in 
Malmquist (1990). 
 
Total tangible assets as reported on the COMPUSTAT 
tapes. 
 
Cash flows generated in previous year and measured as 
the total of income before extraordinary items and 
depreciation and amortization. Data are taken from 
COMPUSTAT tapes. 
 
Total amount of capital expenditures incurred by the 
firm as reported on COMPUSTAT tapes. 
 
 
With all the variables defined above, the 
two-stage switching model of equations (9), 
(10), and (11) can be expressed as follow: 
ACi = 1 + 2SZi + 3LVi +  
4AGi - i (12) 
EXFi = F1 + F2ATFi + F3CFFi + F4CEFi –  
FWFi + Fi iff ACi > 0     (13) 
EXSi = S1 + S2ATSi + S2CFSi + S3CESi  
+ SWSi + Si iff ACi  0     (14) 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
The sample firms are selected from the list 
of companies identified by Malmquist (1990) 
for the period of 1985 (his list consists of 316 
sample firms). The values of several variables 
(exploration and production) are derived from 
the Malmquist's data and the data on other 
variables are collected from COMPUSTAT 
tapes. CUSIP number from the Malmquist's list 
is used as a basis to extract data from 
CUMPUSTAT tapes for variables not in the 
Malmquist's list. Some firms are eliminated 
from the Malmquist's list because they tend to 
be those for which several variable values from 
COMPUSTAT data tapes are missing or they 
are not available in the tapes. The available 
sample of 187 firms is finally used in this 
paper. This sample represent 80 firms adopting 
full cost method and 107 firms adopting 
successful efforts method. Since structural test 
is not performed in this paper, control sample 
is not established. Summary statistics of 
variables for full-cost and successful efforts 
firms are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables for FC and SE Firms: Mean and Standard 
Deviation in 1985 
Variable Full Cost 
Successful 
Efforts 
t-value 
two-tail 
p-value 
n 80  107    
AC Equation: 
SZ 
 
 
LV 
 
 
AG 
6042.36 
(13888.26) 
 
0.9215  
 (0.9483) 
 
 2697.63  
(6247.45) 
2513.78  
(11437.51) 
 
1.5518  
 (3.4784) 
 
 888.62  
(2463.59) 
1.9034 
 
 
-1.5766 
 
 
2.7269 
0.0595 
 
 
0.1188 
 
 
0.0081 
EXP Equation: 
EXP 
 
 
AT 
 
 
CF 
 
 
CE 
2875.76  
(6338.60) 
 
5810.90  
(11494.27) 
 
635.84  
 (1392.44) 
 
 607.28  
(1285.53) 
1045.43  
(301.91) 
 
2998.23  
(11465.81) 
 
218.48  
 (832.40) 
 
 300.05  
(807.92) 
2.6177 
 
 
1.6579 
 
 
2.5513 
 
 
2.0005 
0.0090 
 
 
0.0980 
 
 
0.0110 
 
 
0.0463 
 
The summary data show that full cost 
companies tend to be larger than successful 
efforts companies in terms of sales and assets. 
These facts seem to be contradictory with the 
hypothesized relationships. It should be noted 
that the hypothesis regarding the size is 
developed before the knowledge of the 
summary statistics to avoid a tendency of 
overfitting the model. Full cost companies 
have relatively lower leverage than do 
successful efforts companies. Relatively large 
production units of full cost companies 
indicate that the FC companies are more 
aggressive in production activities. Moreover, 
full cost firms have higher exploration and 
capital expenditures. In general, full cost and 
successful efforts firms are statistitically 
different in terms of size, aggresiveness, explo-
ration expenditures, cash flows, and capital 
expenditures. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 4 reports the estimates of the 
switching regression model. The probit 
estimates of the accounting-choice equation 
are presented in panel A, and the OLS 
estimates of the exploration equations 
(corrected for self-selection bias) are reported 
in panels B and C for full cost and successful 
efforts samples, respectively. The models are 
estimated by OLS without weighting so that 
heteroscedasticity may present. It is assumed 
that the problem of heteroscedasticity does not 
affect the analysis results. 
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Table 4. Estimates of the Switching Regression Model 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-ratio 
(Chi-sqr) 
Significance 
(Pr>Chi) 
Panel A. Accpunting Choice Equation: 
   Intercept 
   SZ 
   LV 
   AG 
0.67061 
0.00019 
0.03431 
-0.00228 
0.13872 
0.00011 
0.04776 
0.00054 
23.3676 
2.6741 
0.5162 
17.6032 
0.0001  
 0.0120  
0.4725  
0.0001  
Chi-squared: 188.39 (Pearson Chi-Square), p > 0.0483 
Log-likelihood: -93.52 
Cases correctly classified as full cost firms: 76.5% (n=80) 
Cases correctly classified as successful efforts firms: 87.5% (n=107) 
 
Panel B. EXP Equation (FC Sample): 
   Intercept 
   AT 
   CF 
   CE 
Selectivity variable 
 
Adjusted R
2
=0.9721 
F=689.51 (p>0.0001) 
 33.5597 
-0.0320 
 2.1108 
2.7791 
  -1.8652 
201.03184 
  0.04995 
0.78347 
0.77217 
 7.99450 
4.5410 
-3.2280 
 0.7310 
1.8660 
-9.0410 
0.0001  
0.0018  
0.4673  
0.0660  
0.0001  
Panel C.  EXP Equation (SE Sample): 
  Intercept 
  AT 
  CF 
  CE 
Selectivity variable 
 
Adjusted R
2
=0.7629 
F=86.27 (p>0.0001) 
57.1083 
0.0403 
2.0198 
0.4958 
-8.8951 
 
23.80120 
0.04572 
0.52674 
0.49948 
5.96019 
2.3990 
0.8890 
3.8350 
0.9930 
-1.4920 
0.0182  
0.3759  
0.0002  
0.3233  
0.1387  
 
Panel A indicates that the classificatory 
power of the criterion function is sufficiently 
high (76.5% for full-costers and 87.% for 
successful efforts firms). Pearson statistic 
indicates that the overall explanatory power of 
the model is statistically significant 
(p>0.0483). Estimation using probit link 
produces similar values for the coefficients of 
explanatory variables also with statistically 
significant goodness-of-fit statistic. Therefore, 
the accounting-choice model has good overall 
explanatory power even though not all 
coefficients are statistically significant. The 
estimated coefficients of agressiveness and 
size variables are statistically significant. The 
sign of size coefficient, however, is not in the 
direction predicted. This implies that the 
political cost theory does not applies to oil and 
gas industry. In general, the firms that are more 
likely to prefer the full cost method are large 
and aggressive. 
After incorporating selectivity variable in 
the model, the results of estimation indicate a 
quite different behavior between the two 
groups of firms with respect to exploration 
expenditure. Table 5 presents comparison of 
coefficients between full cost and successful 
efforts firms taken from Panel A and Panel B 
of Table 3. 
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Table 5. Comparison of Coefficients 
Variable Full Cost 
Successful 
Efforts 
Statistic 
of difference 
AT 
CF 
CE 
Selectivity variable 
-0.0320* 
 2.1108   
2.7791   
  -1.8652* 
0.0403  
2.0198* 
0.4958   
-8.8951  
1.0663   
0.1000   
2.6096* 
0.7290   
Statistic of difference was determined using mean difference test by assuming that the coefficients were 
random variable drawn from independent population. Choi test can also be used. *Statistically 
significant at p < 0.05. 
Statistically significant difference in one of 
the coefficients (CE) indicates that structurally 
the two equations are not equivalent. This 
means that the variables impact differently in 
each of the two groups of firms. The estimated 
coefficient of size in the full cost sample is 
negative and smaller than that in the successful 
efforts sample. While CF coefficient in the SE 
sample is statistically significant, it is not the 
case in the FC sample. The estimated 
coefficients of cash flow (CF) suggest that the 
availability of internally generated funds is 
important in explaining exploration variation 
for the SE firms, but not for the FC firms. The 
CE coefficient in the FC sample is larger and 
statistically significant compared to that in SE 
sample. For the FC sample, exploration 
funding decreases proportionately with firm 
size and increases with capital expenditure. 
Statistically significant difference in CE 
variable implies that capital investments are 
complementary decisions for the SE sample 
but they are independent of exploration 
decisions for the FC sample. The estimated 
coefficient of the selectivity variable for the 
FC sample is negative and statistically 
significant at less than 0.05 level. This result 
suggests that the average exploration 
expenditure for full cost firms, given the firm-
specific characteristics, is likely to exceed 
what these firms would have spent under the 
successful method. However, this is not the 
case for SE firms which are unlikely to spend 
more on exploration under the successful than 
they would have spent under the full cost 
method. This supports the idea that the choice 
of method is not a random action by both 
groups of firms. 
In summary, the exploration activities for 
FC firms are more associated with the size and 
the capital expenditure while for SE firms, the 
exploration activities are more determined by 
the level of available fund generated by 
previous operation. These results indicate that 
the two groups of firms are different in 
characteristics as well as in the structure of 
their exploration decisions. Therefore, it would 
not be correct to assume that the sample firms 
in the two groups are randomly selected from a 
homogeneous population. 
For comparative purposes, the OLS esti-
mates of the exploration equations without 
correction for self-selection bias and the 
corresponding estimates of the two-stage 
regression model are reported in Table 6. 
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Table 6. OLS Estimates of the Structural Regression Model 
 
Variable     
Coefficient, (Standard Error), t-value  Statistic  
of difference  FC firms SE Firms 
Ordinary LS:  
  Intercept 
 
 
 
   AT 
 
 
 
   CF 
 
 
 
   CE 
 
 
Adjusted R
2
=0.9425 
 
Two-Stage LS: 
  Intercept 
 
 
 
   AT 
 
 
 
   CF 
 
 
 
   CE 
 
 
 
Adjusted R
2
=0.9721 
 
33.5597  
(201.0318) 
0.1670  
 
-0.0321  
(0.04996) 
-0.6420  
 
2.1109  
(0.78348) 
2.6940* 
 
2.7791  
(0.77218) 
3.5990* 
 
 
 
695.9345  
(153.25513) 
4.5410* 
 
-0.1155  
(0.03577) 
-3.2280* 
 
-0.4466  
(0.61124) 
-0.7310  
 
1.0549  
(0.56541) 
1.8660  
 
30.2010   
(15.63073)  
1.9320** 
 
0.0274  
(0.04512) 
0.6090 
 
2.1839  
(0.51819) 
4.2150* 
 
0.6128  
(0.49621) 
1.2350  
 
 
 
57.1082  
(23.80120) 
2.3990* 
 
0.0406  
(0.04572) 
0.8890  
 
2.0198  
(0.52674) 
3.8350* 
 
0.4957  
(0.49947) 
0.9930  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.8783  
 
 
 
-0.0807  
 
 
 
2.4611* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.5476* 
 
 
 
-3.0382* 
 
 
 
0.7397  
 
 
Statistic of difference was determined using mean difference test by assuming that the 
coefficients were random variable drawn from independent population. Choi test can also be 
used. *Statistically significant at p < 0.05. 
In the case of FC firms, estimated coeffi-
cients are quite different both in sign and 
significance except for capital expenditure 
variable. Evaluating the sign and significance, 
it appears that the OLS consistently over-
estimates all the explanatory variable 
coefficients. This means that the OLS will 
predict higher exploration expenditures after 
implementation of mandatory method than will 
the two-stage least square regression. For the 
case of SE sample, even though all estimates -
have the same signs under both methods, only 
the coefficient of cash flows is significant and 
it is slightly higher under the OLS. The OLS 
consistently overestimates the cash flow 
coefficient by about 8 percent. When the 
insignificant coefficients are set to zero, the 
overall overestimation by OLS for full cost and 
successful efforts firms combined is almost 
100 percent.  
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Table 7 presents predictions of the 
expected values of exploration expenditures 
for both successful and full cost samples if 
they had chosen the alternative method. These 
average expected values are determined by 
applying the estimated coefficients from both 
the switching regression (ignoring the selectiv-
ity term) and OLS functions for using data 
from all FS and SE sample firms. If all firms 
used the same accounting method before the 
issuance of SFAS No. 19, the mean value of 
exploration expenditures predicted by two-
stage LS would have been lower under the full 
cost method (554.19) than under the successful 
efforts method (877.15). If full cost firms were 
forced to switch to mandatory method, the 
mean value of exploration cost would have 
been greatly higher. Similarly, if SE firms used 
FC method, the mean value of exploration 
expenditures would have been higher also. In 
both cases, the increase is about five times the 
value under the preferred method. These 
results suggest that firms choose between 
accounting methods on the basis of their own 
characteristics and the relative advantages of 
each method. 
 
 
Table 7. Average Expected Value of Exploration Costs if All Firms Were Using the Same Method 
Before the Release of SFAS No. 19 
 Two-stage Regression  OLS Estimates 
 All Firms FC Firms SE Firms  All Firms FC Firms SE Firms 
E[EXF] 
E[EXS] 
554.1924 
877.1538 
381.6310 
1878.7400 
683.2103 
128.3051 
 1311.1000 
 894.3302 
2875.7600 
1950.6700 
141.2514 
104.5435 
 
Except for SE firms, the OLS predicts 
higher exploration expenditures than does the 
two-stage LS. In contrast to the prediction 
under two-stage LS, if full cost firms were 
forced to switch to mandatory method, the 
mean value of exploration cost would have 
been lower under the OLS method. However, 
if SE firms used FC method, the mean value of 
exploration expenditures would have been 
higher. In both cases, the decrease and increase 
in the exploration costs are not as great as 
those under two-stage LS. Again, these results 
indicate that firms select an accounting method 
on the basis of their own characteristics and the 
relative advantages of each alternative method.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: 
This paper examines the suspicion about 
the presence of self-selection bias in dichoto-
mous data used in major empirical accounting 
studies investigating the economic conse-
quences of mandatory accounting change. In 
particular, this paper addresses the selection 
bias in the data representing oil and gas firms 
which were classified as full cost and 
successful efforts adopters. Replicating the 
procedure used by Shehata (1991), the 
switching regression analysis indicates the 
presence of selection bias in the data separat-
ing oil and gas firms into both groups. 
Therefore, correction for this bias is important 
in the assessment of the effects of SFAS No. 
19 on exploration activities. This result 
confirms the existence of bias in dichotomous 
data as indicated by Shehata. The switching 
regression model predicts potential decline in 
full cost firms' exploration in response to 
SFAS No. 19 if it were made effective. On the 
other hand, the OLS consistently overestimates 
all the explanatory variable coefficients. This 
means that the OLS will predict higher 
exploration expenditures after implementation 
of mandatory method than will the two-stage 
least square regression.  
The results of this paper are subject to 
some limitations. First, only three variables are 
used as explanatory variables for criterion and 
structural functions so that some important 
factors affecting the results may have been 
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excluded from the model. Second, the sample 
represents only a specific industry. Therefore, 
the conclusion in this paper may not be 
applicable to other industry. Third, this paper 
does not test the effect of selection bias on the 
structural changes in the exploration expen-
ditures by comparing the result of both OLS 
and two-stage LS. Because the standard had 
not become effective since its withdrawal, 
there were not enough data on the actual 
switch of method on the part of FC firms 
several years immediately after its release or 
withdrawal. Finally, several values of variables 
are derived from the data of other study. 
Malmquist's data are normalized and logged 
data and the derivation to original values did 
not take out the normalization effect on the 
data. Therefore, the results in this paper are 
affected by any measurement error caused by 
the incomplete derivation. 
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